Legislative Impairment of Natural Gas Contracts: Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. by Hogue, Joel R.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 3 
Spring 1984 
Legislative Impairment of Natural Gas Contracts: Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. 
Joel R. Hogue 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joel R. Hogue, Legislative Impairment of Natural Gas Contracts: Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas 
Power & Light Co., 19 Tulsa L. J. 384 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss3/3 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENTS
LEGISLATIVE IMPAIRMENT OF NATURAL
GAS CONTRACTS: ENERGYRESERVES
GROUP, INC. v. X4NSAS POWER &
LIGHT CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. I involved an action
filed by a natural gas producer, Energy Reserves Group (ERG), to en-
force the contractual provisions of its long-term agreements with Kan-
sas Power & Light (KPL).2 The conflict centered around indefinite
price escalator clauses3 in those agreements that allowed the contract
price for natural gas to rise in response to certain outside factors.4 As a
result of the inclusion of these escalator clauses in the contracts, the
passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 19785 created the potential of
substantially increasing the price of the natural gas sold by ERG.6 The
Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act7 (Kansas Act) was passed, in
part, to limit such increases.8 ERG contended that the Kansas Act was
a violation of the contract clause of the United States Constitution. 9
Despite the Constitution's proscription of state legislation that impairs
contractual obligations, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
1. 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
2. Id at 703.
3. "'Indefinite price escalator clause' means any provision of a gas purchase contract which
provides for the establishment or adjustment of the price of natural gas delivered under such
contract by reference to other prices for natural gas, for crude oil, or for refined petroleum prod-
ucts." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1402(c) (1983).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 701; see infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
6. The NGPA modified federal price controls under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C.§§ 717c-717d (1982), with upward-adjustable ceilings that respond monthly to various economic
factors. See id §§ 3311-3319. Additionally, the NGPA extended federal regulation to the intra-
state gas market. Id § 3315.
7. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1401 to -1415 (1983).
8. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230 Kan. 176, -, 630 P.2d
1142, 1152 (1981).
9. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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of the Kansas Act.' 0
Energy Reserves is important for several reasons. Recent Supreme
Court decisions had cast a shroud of confusion over the contract clause
that left its application uncertain.1' The Energy Reserves decision helps
clear up this imbroglio and establishes an interpretation that allows
states, under appropriate circumstances, to alter contractual agreements
that touch areas of general public concern. 2 Energy Reserves also
proved useful because it resolved similar litigation with even greater
ramifications pending in an Oklahoma federal court. 3 The Energy
Reserves decision rendered the Oklahoma case moot and shifted ap-
proximately $1 billion from the pockets of producers to consumers and,
to a lesser extent, certain public utilities. 4 Moreover, the decision rep-
resents a reaffirmation of the post-1937 reluctance of the Court to over-
turn state economic legislation on a contract clause basis,'5 an
approach that may be essential in a time of crisis in the energy
industry.
The first purpose of this Note is to analyze previous contract
clause cases and the Energy Reserves decision to determine current con-
tract clause application. Secondly, this Note will focus on the effect of
the decision in Oklahoma. Finally, the Note will explore the signifi-
cance of the Energy Reserves decision in light of the nation's continuing
natural gas glut inasmuch as the decision leaves open the possibility
that states could take advantage of the liberal interpretation of the con-
tract clause to deal with current problems associated with the
oversupply.
II. CONTRACT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
A. Law Prior to Energy Reserves
The contract clause declares, "No State shall. . . make any...
10. Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 710.
11. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
13. Energy Consumers & Producers Ass'n v. Baker, Nos. 79-320-D; 79-823-D (W.D. Okla.
filed Mar. 20, 1979) (withdrawn June 7, 1983). The second docket number refers to a suit filed by
the Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Association and Amerada Hess Corporation against the
same defendants. The suits were consolidated and the case was fully briefed, but the trial was
postponed pending a decision in Energy Reserves. When that decision was reached, plaintiffs
withdrew their complaint. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
15. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-7 (1978).
1984]
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss3/3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:384
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."16 A strict interpretation
of this clause was frequently used in the early years of the United
States as a constitutional check on state legislation.17 Included within
the Court's interpretation of the contract clause was the concept that
when a party enters a contract, that contract incorporates the positive
state law in existence at that time. 8 In keeping with this principle,
early Court opinions concluded that the state's police power-the right
to protect public health and morals' 9 -is a part of the state's sovereign
authority and accordingly must be incorporated into all contracts.20
Consequently, parties cannot make a contract that is contrary to state
law and rely upon the contract clause to invalidate that law.
Modem interpretation of the contract clause began in 1934 when
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell.2 ' This decision expanded the concept of police
power to include economic concerns as justification for the state's exer-
cise of its police power "to safeguard the vital interests of its people. 22
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ed. 1.
17. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (The states are part of the
union which "has a constitution the supremacy of which all acknowledge, and which imposes
limits to the legislatures of the several States, which none claim a right to pass."). See generally J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 419-24 (1978) (thor-
ough discussion of the contract clause during the Marshall and Taney years).
18. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 352 (1827). Justice Holmes later stated that,
"One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the
power of the State by making a contract about them." Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349, 357 (1908); see L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at § 9-5.
19. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1880).
20. For the development of this interpretation, see, e.g., West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532-36 (1848) (a state has certain powers, e.g. eminent domain, that it cannot
contract away); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 670 (1878) (ordinance prohibiting ferti-
lizer company from operating within city upheld as protecting public health despite city charter
granting such power); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1880) (state statute prohibiting sale
of lottery tickets upheld as protecting public morals despite previous 25-year charter granted by
legislature to lottery company); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 481-83 (1905) (extended police
power to contracts between private individuals when state legislatures enact laws to reclaim
swampland and erect dams for the public good).
21. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). The State of Minnesota passed a statute during the depression that
extended the time period under which a defaulting mortgagor could redeem his property after
foreclosure. Id at 416-18. Home Building & Loan had purchased Blaisdell's property at a fore-
closure sale when the contractual redemption period was one year. The Minnesota statute ex-
tended the redemption period, and, as a result, Blaisdell was able to redeem his property. Home
Building & Loan challenged the statute alleging that it impaired its contract. Id at 418-20. The
Supreme Court upheld the statute. Id at 448.
22. Id at 434, 437; see also Note, Revival of the Contract Clause: Allied Structural Steel Co.
v. Spannaus and United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 65 VA. L. REv. 377, 382-83 (1979) (points
to the importance of Blaisdell in adding economic concerns to the state's police power). The
Blaisdell Court stated, "Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order." 290 U.S. at 435.
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Even so, Blaisdell recognized that the state's power to impair contracts
in the vital interests of its people is not absolute. The Supreme Court
examined those significant factors that justify a state's use of its police
power and developed an analytic approach for determining those cir-
cumstances in which contractual impairment by a state is justified.23
Basic to the Blaisdell approach is the presence of an emergency that
justifies invoking the state's police power.2 4 Additionally, any atten-
dant contractual impairment 25 must serve a legitimate end, and the
means selected to accomplish that end must be both reasonable and
appropriate.26
The contract clause almost turned into a historical relic in the
years that followed Blaisdell.2 7  Subsequent relaxation of the emer-
gency requirement28 and a general trend toward judicial deference to
23. 290 U.S. at 444-47. The first factor the Court considered in its analysis was the existence
of an emergency "which furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the
State to protect the vital interests of the community." Id at 444. Second, the Court noted that the
legislation must be "addressed to a legitimate end, that is, the legislation was not for the mere
advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a basic interest of society." Id at 445.
Third, "the relief afforded and justified by the emergency. . . could only be of a character appro-
priate to that emergency and could be granted only upon reasonable conditions." Id Finally, the
legislation must be "temporary in operation." Id at 447.
The Court found that an emergency existed because the economic turmoil of the depression
threatened many people with the loss of their homes unless some action was taken. Id at 444-45.
The Court also found the Minnesota statute granting a mortgagor a reasonable extension beyond
the date stipulated in his mortgage contract for redemption was a reasonable and appropriate
means of preventing the threatened "loss of homes and lands which furnish those in possession the
necessary shelter and means of subsistence." Id at 445. Finally, the statute was temporary since
it was "limited to the exigency which called it forth" and in any event "could not validly outlast
the emergency or be so extended as virtually to destroy the contracts." Id at 447. The combina-
tion of these factors led the Court to find that the contract clause had not been violated by the
Minnesota statute. Id
24. Id at 444.
25. It is important to note that the impairment allowed in Blaisdell merely altered the reme-
dies of the bank; it did not completely eliminate them. Id at 445-47. Shortly after Blaisdell, the
Court held that a total elimination of rights or remedies would not withstand a contract clause
attack. See W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 62 (1935); W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934).
26. 290 U.S. at 445.
27. Actually, its decline began as early as the late 19th century when the due process clause
began to assume the contract clause role as a check on state power. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at
§ 8-2. The subsuming character of the due process clause during the substantive due process era
was attributed to its broader coverage of economic rights than the contract clause. See, e.g., All-
geyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890); see also Note, State Adstment of Private Employer's Obligations Under Pension Plan Vio-
lates Contract Clause, 9 SETON HALL 784, 788-92 (1978) (contrasts the rise in prominence of the
due process clause with the decline in importance of the contract clause); cf. The Supreme Court,
1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 72, 83-84 (1977) (points to the takings provision of the fifth amend-
ment as having assumed part of the contract clause role).
28. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1940) (financial condi-
tion of banks was tenuous enough to justify extending duration of statute affecting withdrawal
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state legislatures29 led to the near demise of the clause as a vehicle for
overturning state legislation.30  Despite its moribund state, however,
the contract clause never completely succumbed. Two recent decisions,
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey3I and Allied Structural Steel Co.
v. Spannaus,32 helped restore some of its former vitality by striking
down state legislation for the first time in nearly forty years on a con-
tract clause rationale.33 Unfortunately, these decisions also created
such confusion as to leave contract clause interpretation unsettled.34
rights beyond the emergency created by the depression); East N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S.
230, 234-35 (1945) (prevention of future emergencies is legitimate reason for exercising state's
police power and impairing contractual obligations); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 22 n.19 (1977) ("Undoubtedly the existence of an emergency and the limited duration of a
relief measure are factors to be assessed in determining the reasonableness of an impairment, but
they cannot be regarded as essential in every case."); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234, 249 n.24 (1978) ("This is not to suggest that only an emergency of great magnitude can
constitutionally justify a state law impairing the obligations of contracts.").
29. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("We have returned to the original
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws."); East N. Y Bank, 326 U.S. at 233
("Once we are in this domain of the reserve power of a State we must respect the 'wide discretion
on the part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary.' "); Sproles v.
Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932) (Court will not "subject the State to an intolerable supervision
hostile to the basic principles of our Government."). See generally L. TRinE, supra note 15, at § 8-
7 (discusses demise of socioeconomic philosophy of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and
the almost complete judicial abdication to legislatures).
30. In fact, from 1938 to 1977 the Supreme Court only struck down two statutes as being
violative of the contract clause. See Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941); Indiana ex rel Ander-
son v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); see also Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the Contract
Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 n.7 (1980) (notes that neither case was a typical case of contract
impairment).
The contract clause's death knell appeared to have been sounded in 1964 when the Court
handed down its decision in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). Simmons involved
the sale of land by the State of Texas. The sales contracts called for forfeiture of the land in the
event the purchaser defaulted; however, the purchaser could reinstate his claim by paying off the
delinquent payments plus interest. Even though this contractual redemption right was perpetual,
the State passed a five-year statute of limitations effectively altering the provision of the contracts.
Id at 498-501. The Court upheld the statute on the basis that the State's desire to perfect land
titles and avoid litigation was sufficient to override any limitations the contract clause might pres-
ent. Id at 511-12; see also P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKiNG 311 (2d ed. 1983) (contract clause application from 1934-82).
Justice Black's dissent sounded more like an obituary. He chastized the Court for balancing
"away the plain guarantee" of the clause, 379 U.S. at 517, lamenting that the Court's interpreta-
tion of Blaisdell had "practically read the Contract Clause out of the Constitution." Id at 523.
31. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
32. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
33. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 86-87 (1978); Note, supra note
22, at 377.
34. One commentator noted that, "For two cases decided so closely together by a Court
whose composition had not changed, the decisions in United States Trust and Spannaus contain a
number of inconsistencies that make it difficult to discern the Court's present attitude toward
contract clause issues." Note, supra note 22, at 395.
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Blaisdell had established a type of means-end standard35 that re-
quired the use of reasonable and appropriate means to bring about a
legitimate end.36 Subsequent cases indicated a willingness to leave the
determination of reasonableness to the state legislature. 37 However, the
United States Trust Court broke with tradition by refusing to defer the
selection of the means to the legislature when the state is a contracting
party.38 The Court reasoned that if a state has an interest in the con-
tract, its actions should not be entitled to presumptive legitimacy.
39
In addition to according less deference to the legislature, the
United States Trust Court modified the Blaisdell standard by declaring
that "an impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and neces-
sary to serve an important public purpose."'  This rather curious com-
35. See Note, The Contract Clause: The Use of a Strict Standard of Reiewfor State Legisla-
tion that Impairs Private Contracts-Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 28 DE PAUL L. REV.
503, 513 (1979).
36. See supra text accompanying note 26.
37. See supra note 27.
38. 431 U.S. at 26. The States of New York and New Jersey established the Port Authority in
1921 to coordinate the affairs of the port of New York. Id at 4. Bonds were sold to private
investors to help finance the operation of the Port Authority and were to be retired through bridge
and tunnel toll revenues. Id at 4-5. There was concern among bondholders that some of the toll
income would be used to subsidize a financially troubled commuter train that was taken over by
the Authority in 1960. Id at 9. Because of this concern, the States passed the "1962 Statutory
Covenant" that required that no money designated for bond retirement be used to finance railroad
deficits. Id at 9-10. However, the energy shortages of the 1970's caused great concern for public
transit. In response, the two States passed 1974 statutes that repealed the 1962 covenant, allowing
the use of toll revenues to subsidize mass transit. Id at 12-14. The statutory repeal was chal-
lenged as a violation of the contract clause, and the Supreme Court agreed. Id at 32. See gener-
all
, 
McTamaney, United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey-The Contract Clause
in a Complex Society, 46 FoR.sAM L. REv. 1 (1977) (discussion of entire litigation by a counsel
for plaintiff).
39. 431 U.S. at 25-26. The Court applied a two-part test for assessing the means selected by a
state when the state is one of the contracting parties. The contract that is impaired by the legisla-
tion may be invalid from its inception under the reserved-powers doctrine if it involves the state's
surrendering an essential attribute of its sovereignty. Id at 23-25. If the contract does not involve
such a surrender, the legislation that impairs the contractual obligations must be reasonable and
necessary, as viewed by the judiciary, before the impairment will be allowed. Id at 25-26; see
McTamaney, supra note 38, at 49-51; Note, supra note 22, at 390-91.
In United States Trust, the Court found that the contractual obligations of New York and
New Jersey were valid because financial obligations of a state do not fall within the realm of
police powers that cannot be contracted away. 431 U.S. at 24-25. Proceeding to the second part of
the test, the Court nevertheless found that the repeal of the statutory covenant with the bondhold-
ers was neither reasonable nor necessary since the States could have achieved the goal of improv-
ing mass transit without destroying the security of the bonds. Id at 29-32.
The Court feared a state might find it expedient to finance public projects by simply abrogat-
ing some of its financial obligations, instead of raising taxes to finance such projects. Id at 26; see
L. TRIE, supra note 15, at 472-73. But see Hurst, Municpal Bonds and the Contract Clause: Look-
ing Beyond United States Trust Company v. New Jersey, 5 HASTIN S CONsT. L.Q. 25, 43 (1978)
(argues that the state interest is really that of the public and that state's contracts should be enti-
tied to the same presumption as private contracts).
40. 431 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
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bination of words appears to forge a partnership between a relaxed
standard of review and a strict one.4 1 However, the Court apparently
perceives no such result since it interprets the reasonableness require-
ment as a matter of the foreseeability of the current circumstances. If
the interests sought to be served by the new legislation were foreseeable
when the original legislation that sanctioned the contracts was adopted,
then the impairment of those contracts through new legislation is not a
reasonable means of serving the current purpose.42 The Court differen-
tiates reasonableness from necessity by reasoning that the impairing
legislation is not necessary if either a less drastic modification or an
alternative means would accomplish the same goal.4  The confusion
surrounding the interpretation of this revised standard is joined by un-
certainty as to its long-term precedential value, since the case was de-
cided by a four-three vote.44
Allied Structural Steel is of greater relevance to Energy Reserves
than United States Trust because it deals with a state's attempt to im-
pair obligations in a contract between private parties a.4  Unfortunately,
this decision only further confuses the situation. The Court attempts to
41. In a lengthy footnote in his dissent, Justice Brennan points out the contradiction created
by this wedding of terms:
Reasonableness generally has signified the most relaxed regime of judicial inquiry ...
Contrariwise, the element of necessity traditionally has played a key role in the most
penetrating mode of constitutional review. . . . The Court's new test, therefore, repre-
sents a most unusual hybrid which manages to merge the two polar extremes of judicial
intervention.. . . [Olne would have fairly thought that as a matter of common sense as
well as doctrine, state policies that are "necessary to serve an important public purpose"
* . . afortior would be "reasonable."
431 U.S. at 54-55 n. 17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The substitution of the term "important" for Blaisdeil's "legitimate" in describing the purpose
of the challenged legislation raises the question whether the Court was attempting to apply the
"middle-tier" approach to judicial scrutiny adopted for certain classifications of equal protection
cases during the early 1970's. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at § 16-30; The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, supra note 27, at 86-87.
42. 431 U.S. at 29.
43. Id at 31.
44. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Stevens. Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion, providing the fourth vote in the decision. Jus-
tices Brennan, White and Marshall dissented. Justices Stewart and Powell took no part in the
decision.
45. 438 U.S. 234, 236-41 (1978). Allied Structural Steel, an Illinois corporation, established a
pension plan which included its Minnesota employees while retaining its rights to amend the plan
in whole or in part. Id at 236-37. Allied had been planning to close its Minnesota office and
discontinue the pension program as to the Minnesota employees. Id at 247. Before the corpora-
tion could do so, the State of Minnesota enacted a law that subjected such pension plans to a
pension funding charge if the plan was terminated or the company's Minnesota offices were
closed. The purpose of the statute was to assure full pensions to all employees who had worked at
least 10 years. Id at 238-39. Allied challenged the statute as being violative of the contract
clause. Id at 239-40. The Supreme Court agreed. Id at 251.
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establish a three-part standard against which statutes impairing con-
tracts between private parties can be measured to determine their con-
stitutional validity. According to the Allied Structural Steel Court,
"[T]he first inquiry must be whether the state law has, in fact, operated
as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. ' 46 The sec-
ond element of the standard requires an assessment by the court of the
reasonableness and necessity of the means selected by the state.47 This
is perplexing because this requirement is an integral part of the stan-
dard applied in United States Trust to evaluate impairing legislation
when the state itself is a party to the contract.48 Understandably, com-
mentators are confused since it appears that the Court has fashioned a
strict standard of review for legislation impairing contracts between
private parties.49 Some even view this standard as being stricter than
that applied when the state is a contracting party.5" This confusion is
unfortunate because the Allied Structural Steel decision actually turns
upon the statute's failure to meet the third part of the test: the require-
46. Id at 244. The severity of the impairment is measured by the parties' reliance upon the
contractual rights and obligations. Id at 245. If one of the parties materially changes his position
in reliance upon a particular provision, the impairment is probably substantial. According to this
test, if no substantial impairment exists, the investigation is at an end; the legislation will be up-
held. Id
Applying the facts in Allied to this element of the standard, the Supreme Court found that a
substantial impairment existed because Allied relied heavily upon its right to modify or cancel the
plan. Action taken in reliance on this right forced Allied to pay an additional $185,000 pursuant
to the statute in order to vest the rights of a number of employees, even though these employees
had no such expectation. Id at 244-47. For a critical review of the Allied Court's application of
this element, see Note, supra 35, at 512-15.
47. 438 U.S. at 244. "The presumption favoring 'legislative judgment as to the necessity and
reasonableness of a particular measure... simply cannot stand in this case." Id at 247 (quoting
United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23); see also Note, supra note 30, at 1624-25 n.12 (laments the
same inconsistency regarding scrutiny of private contracts and decries the absence of any standard
for assessing the means except an "unstructural factor-based balancing approach").
48. "[C]omplete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not
appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake." United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 26; see
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
49. One observer stated, "It appears that theAllied majority has extended the stringent stan-
dard of review established in United States Trust to private contracts." Note, supra note 35, at
518; see also Sovern, Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus: Added Obligations The Contract Clause,
andDue Process, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 119, 128 (1980) (sees a divergence of standards of
review with the due process clause becoming more relaxed and the contract clause becoming more
strict); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 33, at 95-96 (views the Court as having adopted
a stricter balancing test between the end and the means).
50. One observer concluded that the old Blaisdell test was being fully restored because the
Court, in striking down the statute, pointed out that the law was not a temporary measure aimed
at dealing with an emergency. Note, supra note 22, at 393-94. This conclusion is not supportable
in light of a footnote that accompanied the majority opinion, stating, "This is not to suggest that
only an emergency of great magnitude can constitutionally justify a state law impairing the obli-
gations of contracts." 438 U.S. at 249 n.24.
8
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ment that the statute address a legitimate end.5'
United States Trust and Allied Structural Steel breathed new life
into the contract clause. The uncertainty regarding the applicability of
the modified contract clause standard awaited resolution in a subse-
quent contract clause challenge.
B. The Energy Reserves Decision
1. Background Information
The 1970's were a time of great instability in the oil and natural
gas markets. American support of Israel led the Arab-dominated Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to embargo oil
sales to the United States in 197352 and later to significantly increase oil
export prices.53 OPEC's actions led to rapid price increases for all en-
ergy sources, reflecting the fact that oil prices act as a barometer for the
pricing of other energy sources.54 Natural gas prices in the unregulated
intrastate market almost doubled from 1973 to 1975.-5 Prices in the
interstate market, however, did not rise as quickly because of heavy
regulation.56 This led to disparities between interstate and intrastate
gas prices and a shortfall in the interstate market.57
In an effort to introduce stability into the energy markets, Presi-
dent Carter recommended a comprehensive energy plan to Congress
that included a natural gas price control proposal.58 After considerable
debate, a joint conference committee of both houses proposed the bill
that was later enacted as the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA).59 The
51. 438 U.S. at 247-50. Since only a handful of employees was affected, id at 248-50, the
Court stated that, "inhere is no showing. . . that this severe disruption of contractual expecta-
tions was necessary to meet an important general social problem." Id at 247.
If the Court had said nothing more, there would have been no confusion regarding the deci-
sion and its basis, but it continued by saying, "The presumption favoring 'legislative judgment as
to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure,' simply cannot stand in this case." Id
(quoting United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23). This statement creates the presumption that the
means selected by the legislature to deal with a general social problem will be closely scrutinized
by the Court.
52. Comment, Cartel Pricing in the International Energy Market: OPEC in Perspectie, 54
OR. L. REv. 643, 653 (1975).
53. Id at 654.
54. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. OF CONG., 95TH CONG., 1ST
SEss., THE ECONOMICS OF THE NATURAL GAS CONTROVERSY 59 (Comm. Print 1977).
55. Id
56. Id at 17.
57. Id
58. Energy: WillAmericans Pay the Price?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 2, 1977, at 13,
15. This plan was announced on April 20, 1977.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
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NGPA was signed into law on November 9, 1978, and took effect on
December 1 of that year.
In addition to extending federal price regulation to intrastate gas
markets, the NGPA sets different ceilings for different types of gas.
Section 102 sets a gradually increasing price ceiling for newly discov-
ered or produced natural gas.6" Section 105(b)(1) establishes the maxi-
mum lawful price for old intrastate gas as "the lower of (A) the price
under the terms of the existing contract. . . or (B) the maximum law-
ful price. . . under section 102. "61 Section 109 is a catchall category
for gas not covered by other sections of the NGPA.62 Congressional
reports clearly indicate that the NGPA was not meant to preempt the
power of the states to enforce lower prices for the sale of natural gas
within the state.63 Accordingly, section 602(a) permits a state "to estab-
lish or enforce any maximum lawful price for the first sale of natural
gas produced in such State which does not exceed the applicable maxi-
mum lawful price, if any, under... this chapter."' 4
2. The Energy Reserves Facts
KPL executed two contracts with ERG's predecessor-in-interest
on September 27, 1975, for the purchase of natural gas at the well-
head.65 The contracts set a purchase price subject to a governmental
price escalator clause 66 and a price redetermination clause.67  These
60. Id § 3312. The price under § 102 for deliveries during the month of December 1978 was
$2.078 per million British thermal units (MMBtus). Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 702.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 3315 (1982). The gas involved in the ERG litigation was classified as old
intrastate gas governed by § 105. Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 702. "Old intrastate gas" de-
scribes gas that was not committed to interstate commerce on November 8, 1978. Id
62. 15 U.S.C. § 3319 (1982). The monthly price under § 102 is always higher than the price
under § 109. Conservation of Power, Water Resources, 18 C.F.R. § 271.101 (1982). The price for
deliveries in December 1978 under § 109 was $1.63 per MMBtus. Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at
702. This is $.44 less than the price allowed under § 102 for the same time period. See supra note
60.
63. The conference agreement provides that nothing in this Act shall affect the authority
of any State to establish or enforce any maximum lawful price for sales of gas in intra-
state commerce which does not exceed the applicable maximum lawful price, if any,
under... this Act. This authority extends to the operation of any indefinite price esca-
lator clause.
103 S. Ct. at 708 (quoting S. CONF. REP. No. 95-1126, 124-25 (1978); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-
1752, 124-25 (1978)).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 3432(a) (1982).
65. 103 S. Ct. at 700. The original contract was actually between KPL and the Clinton Oil
Co.; ERG assumed Clinton's interest. Id The two contracts involved were to remain in effect for
the life of the field or the life of the processing plants associated with the field. Id at 701.
66. The governmental price escalator clauses of the contracts read as follows:
If any federal or Kansas regulatory or governmental authority having jurisdiction in
the premises shall at any time hereafter fix a price per MCF applicable to any natural gas
10
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two clauses, known as "indefinite escalator clauses, ' 68 allowed the con-
tract price of gas to rise in response to the occurrence of specified events
outside the contract.69  The exercise of either escalator clause by ERG
required KPL to obtain permission from the Kansas Corporation Com-
mission (Commission) to pass the increase through to consumers.70
The contracts also provided that if the Commission denied the pass-
through and KPL elected not to pay the increase, ERG could terminate
the contracts on written notice.7'
In response to the 1978 federal enactment of the NGPA, the Kan-
sas legislature passed the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act
(Kansas Act) to impose price controls on the intrastate gas market.72
The Kansas Act applies only to contracts for the sale of intrastate gas
entered into before April 20, 1977.71 The September 27, 1975, contracts
between KPL and ERG's predecessor for the sale of natural gas within
the state of Kansas fell within the provisions of the Kansas Act. Sec-
tion 55-1404 of the Kansas Act provides that, in determining prices set
by indefinite price escalators, no consideration shall be given to ceiling
of any vintage produced in Kansas, higher than the contract price then in effect under
this gas contract, the price to be paid for gas thereafter shall be increased to equal such
regulated price. In that event, the increased price shall be effective as of the date of
action of the governmental or regulatory authority establishing the regulated price, or its
effective date, whichever is later ....
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230 Kan. 176, -, 630 P.2d 1142, 1145
(1981).
67. The price redetermination clauses gave the seller the option to have the price of its gas
redetermined every two years.
mhe parties shall mutually redetermine the price by considering three (3) contracts
undei which the highest prices are actually being paid for flowing gas ninety (90) days
prior to the date the redetermined price is to be effective. The contracts to be considered
shall.., be for gas produced in Kansas ....
Id
68. See supra note 3.
69. For example, if a governmental authority fixes a price for natural gas higher than the
price under the contracts, a governmental price escalator clause allows the contract price to be
adjusted to that higher price. 103 S. Ct. at 701.
70. Id. In June 1978 the Commission granted KPL an automatic pass-through of wholesale
gas cost increases upon written notice, retaining the authority to review and revoke any such pass-
through under normal standards for reviewing rate increases. Id. at 702 n.3.
71. Id at 701.
72. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1401 to -1415 (1983).
73. Id § 55-1403. "Only natural gas purchase contracts entered into before April 20, 1977,
providing for the sale, within this state, of natural gas produced in this state and not committed or
dedicated to interstate commerce on November 8, 1978, shall be subject to the provisions of this
act." Id
The dates were not selected randomly. April 20, 1977, was the date President Carter an-
nounced plans to place permanent price controls on all natural gas production. See supra note 58.
November 8, 1978, was the day before the NGPA was enacted. See supra text accompanying note
59.
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prices set by federal authorities or prices paid in Kansas under other
contracts.74 Section 55-1405 limits the monthly price of old intrastate
gas to the maximum allowed under section 109(b) of the NGPA
In November 1978, ERG requested a gas price increase to the sec-
tion 102 level pursuant to the governmental price escalator clause.76
KPL failed to file a timely pass-through application with the Commis-
sion, did not obtain Commission approval for the pass-through, and
announced it would not pay the increased price. 77  When ERG at-
tempted to terminate the contracts, KPL asserted that the Kansas Act
denied ERG the right to receive an increase pursuant to section 102.78
Thereupon, ERG requested an increase to the section 102 ceiling price
under the price redetermination clause.79 KPL responded that section
55-1404 of the Kansas Act extinguished KPL's obligation to comply
with the price redetermination clause.8 0
In a declaratory judgment action, ERG contended that sections
55-1404 and 55-1405 of the Kansas Act violated the contract clause be-
cause they diminished the effect of the indefinite escalator clauses in
the contracts by limiting the increases allowed under the NGPA. The
Kansas trial court found that the Kansas Act did not violate the con-
tract clause of the United States Constitution and that the NGPA's im-
position of ceiling prices on intrastate gas did not trigger the
governmental escalator clause.8" Both the Kansas Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings.82
3. The Energy Reserves Standard
An initial reading of Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court
may leave the reader perplexed since the Court determined that there
was not a sufficient impairment of ERG's contract to give rise to a con-
74. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1404 (1983).
75. Id § 55-1405. The NGPA provided for higher ceiling prices in order to stimulate new
production. 103 S. Ct. at 702. The apparent rationale for limiting the increases allowed for old
intrastate gas was that there was no need to encourage production of gas that was already being
produced. Brief for Appellee at n.64 and accompanying text, Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v.
Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983) (available Aug. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Sup. Ct. Brief file).
76. 103 S. Ct. at 703.
77. Energy Reserves, 230 Kan. at -, 630 P.2d at 1146-47.




82. Id at 710; 230 Kan. at -, 630 P.2d at 1154.
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tract clause claim. 3 Despite the fact that the remaining points were
unnecessary to resolve the constitutional issue,84 Blackmun authored a
full-blown analysis of the contract clause. This is unusual since the
Court normally avoids dealing with constitutional issues not essential
to its decision. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the additional
discussion is included to clear up the confusion created byAilied Struc-
tural Steel and United States Trust.85 As a result of Blackmun's efforts,
the Energy Reserves opinion pulls together the scattered odds and ends
of earlier cases and establishes a uniform contract clause standard.
Reduced to its barest essentials, the appropriate standard evinced
by the Energy Reserves Court is as follows: A state is constitutionally
justified in substantially impairing contractual obligations if the state
regulation is addressed to "a significant and legitimate public purpose
. . . such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic
problem" 86 and the means selected to achieve that end is based "upon
reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public pur-
pose."87  Determination of the reasonableness and necessity of the
means selected is normally deferred to the state legislature unless the
state is a contracting party.88
Allied Structural Steel made it clear that the initial inquiry should
be whether a substantial contractual impairment actually exists.8 9 It is
not enough that state legislation minimally impairs the party's con-
tract;90 the challenging party must have relied upon receiving perfor-
mance of the impaired portion of the contract.91 If the Court
83. Since § 602(a) of the NGPA left the states with the option of establishing lower mini-
mums for natural gas than those established by the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982), and the State
of Kansas had extensively and intrusively supervised the natural gas industry in the past, 103 S.
Ct. at 706 & n.18, none of ERG's contractual expectations were impaired by the State of Kansas'
action in regulating natural gas prices. Id at 708. The contracts stated that neither party was
liable for default for compliance with present and future state and federal laws. Id at 707.
84. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, which lamented this judicial overkill. They questioned the necessity of further inquiry
since no substantial impairment was found. 103 S. Ct. at 710.
85. It appears that the Court desired to clarify its position on the contract clause in part to
avoid continuing litigation in other states on essentially the same issues. Almost identical statutes
exist in Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 260.1-.13 (1982), and New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 62-7-1 to -9.1 (Supp. 1983), and similar litigation was under way in United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Energy Consumers & Producers Ass'n v. Baker, Nos.
79-320-D; 79-823-D (W.D. Okla. filed Mar. 20, 1979) (withdrawn June 7, 1983).
86. 103 S. Ct. at 705.
87. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22, quoted in Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 705.
88. 103 S. Ct. at 705-06.
89. 438 U.S. at 244.
90. Id at 245.
91. Id; see supra note 46.
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determines that a severe impairment does exist, the inquiry then is
pushed "to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state
legislation."92 Energy Reserves retains this determination as the first
consideration.93
Two factors influenced the Energy Reserves Court's finding that a
substantial impairment did not exist. First, although it is true that the
contracts indicated that indefinite escalator clauses were placed there
for the purpose of compensating ERG for "anticipated increases in the
value of [its] gas,"94 the Court found it unlikely that ERG had relied
upon the clauses to give them a windfall from the deregulation brought
about by the NGPA.95 Secondly, the contracts involved natural gas,
which had been the subject of heavy regulation in Kansas for more
than seventy-five years.96 Therefore, ERG should have entered the
contract with full knowledge that the agreement was subject to any fu-
ture restrictions that Kansas might place on the price. In fact, the con-
tract stated that it was subject to "relevant present and future state and
federal law." 97 This suggests that ERG knew or should have known
that the state might regulate the price it was entitled to receive.
Finding no substantial impairment, the Court was without reason
to investigate further, but Justice Blackmun's opinion proceeds as if
such an impairment existed.98 A simple reading of the opinion does
not reveal the necessity for this continued discussion, but it is reason-
able to assume that the Court recognized the opportunity to clear up
the uncertainty created by United States Trust and Allied Structural
Steel regarding the Court's role in scrutinizing state legislation.99 Ac-
cordingly, the Court proceeds to hold that an impairment is justified
only if there is "a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the
regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or eco-
nomic problem."'" The finding of a legitimate public purpose assures
92. 438 U.S. at 245.
93. 103 S. Ct. at 704-05.
94. Id at 707 (emphasis in original). The clauses were also included to compensate ERG for
increases in operating costs. Id at 701.
95. Id at 705-06.
96. Id at 706 n.18.
97. Id at 707; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-20 (contract incorporates positive
law of the state).
98. 103 S. Ct. at 708.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
100. 103 S. Ct. at 705. This portion of the standard has its historical origins in the Blaisdell
decision, which required that legislation be addressed to a legitimate end. 290 U.S. at 445; see
supra text accompanying note 25. Subsequently, both the Allied Structural Steel and United States
Trust Courts required the finding of an important public purpose. Allied, 438 U.S. at 247; United
1984]
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that the "State is exercising its police power, rather than providing a
benefit to special interests."''1
The Supreme Court identified two public concerns with which the
Kansas Act dealt. First, the Court concluded that the State of Kansas
was justified in using its police powers "to protect consumers from the
escalation of natural gas prices caused by deregulation."' 1 2 Secondly,
the Court also believed the State had a legitimate interest in correcting
the imbalance between interstate and intrastate markets. 10 3 While the
Court is correct in finding that these two interests affected the public, it
is not entirely clear that they were sufficient to justify impairing ERG's
contracts.
It appears that the State of Kansas was correct in trying to protect
consumers"° from increased gas utility costs brought on by deregula-
tion, although a fairly persuasive argument exists to the contrary.
While it is true that KPL produced evidence that Kansas consumers
would pay an estimated additional $128 million, 0 5 a possibly con-
servative estimate,1° it does not necessarily follow that the actual im-
pact would have been that severe. Even supporters of the bill admitted
that the Kansas Act would only "provide a modicum of restraint on
some utility price increases."107 The effects of the price escalations
States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25. Energy Reserves describes a signpfcant and legitimate public purpose
as being a remedy to a "broad and general social or economic problem." 103 S. Ct. at 705.
101. 103 S. Ct. at 705.
102. Id at 708.
103. Id
104. ERG initially argued that consumer protection from the effects of deregulation was con-
trary to any significant and legitimate public concern because the legislation was not for the bene-
fit of the public but for the special interests of KPL. Brief for Appellant at rn.41-44 and
accompanying text, Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697
(1983) (available Aug. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Sup. Ct. Brief file). ERG based its
argument on the fact that KPL could automatically pass its costs on to consumers through exercise
of the purchased-gas adjustment clause. Id However, such pass-through could be revoked by the
Commission, and in fact, KPL was denied the authority to pass the § 102 increase on to consum-
ers. Id at n.45.
Notwithstanding this denial, ERG's argument was flawed because KPL still could have
passed the costs on to consumers through normal rate increase proceedings. See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 66-117 (1980). The difference is that the PGA clause, if allowed, would have permitted an
automatic increase, whereas the normal rate increase proceeding would have required KPL to
give 30-days notice before each increase. Id In any event, the bulk of the costs would have been
passed on to consumers under the theory that public utilities are entitled to earn a reasonable rate
of return on their investments. It seems unlikely that a rate hike to cover increased operating
expenses incurred by KPL because of increased gas purchase prices would have been denied.
105. Brief for Appellee at n.70 and accompanying text, Energy Reserves.
106. Id at n.24. Nationwide figures were proving to be about 10-13% higher. Id If these
percentage figures were applicable in Kansas, the actual amount would have been closer to $140
million, assuming this remained constant through 1984.
107. Brief for Appellant at n.44 and accompanying text, Energy Reserves.
15
Hogue: Legislative Impairment of Natural Gas Contracts: Energy Reserves
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983
CONTRA CT CLA USE
would have been considerably greater in some states,108 but in Kansas
less than ten percent of all natural gas sold was affected by the Kansas
Act limitations."°9 No doubt the deregulation would have had an effect
in Kansas; therefore, the Kansas Act served a legitimate public pur-
pose. However, given the limited effect of deregulation in Kansas, it is
not apparent that the Act served a sign4cant public purpose.
It is not entirely clear from the Court's opinion what is meant by
"correcting the imbalance between the interstate and intrastate mar-
kets."' 10 The Court seems to recognize that the State of Kansas has a
legitimate interest in protecting the Kansas natural gas market from the
interstate market. If the price of unregulated intrastate gas climbs sig-
nificantly higher than gas available on the regulated interstate market,
the price differential encourages Kansas purchasers to buy out of
state."' It is pure speculation, however, to say that the Court upholds a
finding of a significant and legitimate public purpose on this basis be-
cause the opinion explains very little.' 2 The Court left little doubt that
if a substantial impairment is found in legislation, it is justified only if
there is a significant and legitimate public purpose behind it."13 It is
not clear, however, how closely the Court will investigate alleged pub-
lic purposes."l 4
If a legitimate public purpose can be identified, "the next inquiry
is whether the adjustment of the 'rights and responsibilities of con-
tracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a char-
108. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
109. Brief for Appellant at nn. 42-43 and accompanying text, Energy Reserves. The uncontra-
dicted evidence put forth by ERG indicated that less than one-fourth of all gas consumed in
Kansas is classified as intrastate gas. Secondly, less than 10% of the intrastate gas contracts con-
tain indefinite price escalators. Of that figure, not all are contracts for old intrastate gas covered
by the Kansas Act. Id
110. 103 S. Ct. at 708. This purported public purpose was not discussed in the opinion written
by the Kansas Supreme Court, 230 Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142.
111. See generally Harrison & Formby, Regional Distortions in Natural Gas Allocations: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 57 N.C.L. REv. 57, 87 (1978) (discusses the shift of purchases in
producing states from intrastate gas to interstate gas).
112. 103 S. Ct. at 708. There is even an absence of discussion of the importance of balancing
these two markets in KPL's brief. See Brief for Appellee at nn. 84-115 and accompanying text,
Energy Reserves.
113. 103 S. Ct. at 705.
114. A footnote in the opinion may explain the Court's failure to closely examine the legiti-
macy of the alleged public purposes. The footnote indicates that the public purpose should be
more carefully scrutinized if there is evidence that the political process has broken down. Id at
708 n.25. The Court made a conclusory statement that no such problem existed in Energy
Reserves. Id The Court cites a law review Note that advocates deferring the choice of public
purposes and determinations of necessity and appropriateness to state legislatures, unless the legis-
lative process has broken down. For the full text of this Note, which develops an entire process-
oriented approach to the contract clause, see Note, supra note 30.
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acter appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation's]
adoption.' "115 Proper assessment of the means selected by the state
was left in disarray by the Allied Structural Steel decision. 16 The
Court proceeded to clear up some of the mystery in Energy Reserves by
pointing out that unless the state is a contracting party, courts properly
should defer the determination of the reasonableness and necessity of
the means selected to the legislature." 7 This signals a return of the
distinction between private and public contracts that had been blurred
by the Allied Structural Steel decision.
Since the contracts in this case were between private parties, the
Court could properly defer to Kansas' judgment. The Court follows
this approach, although Justice Blackmun briefly discusses the propri-
ety of the Kansas Act as a reasonable and appropriate means of effectu-
ating the purposes of the Act." 8 If the Kansas legislature hoped to
protect Kansas markets from the lower interstate market, it is not read-
ily apparent that reducing the price of intrastate gas already under con-
tract brought about that result."' A purchaser such as KPL could not
get interstate gas any cheaper absent the Kansas Act because it was
already contractually committed for current gas needs.' 20
III. IMPACT OF THE DECISION
There was perhaps more interest in Oklahoma in the outcome of
this case than in Kansas.' 2' Oklahoma interest stemmed from the fact
115. 103 S. Ct. at 705 (quoting United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22).
116. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
117. 103 S. Ct. at 705-06. "Unless the State itself is a contracting party. .. '[a]s is customary
in reviewing economic and social regulation'. . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment as
to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure."' Id (quoting United States Trust,
431 U.S. at 22-23).
118. Id at 709.
119. It is apparent that reducing the cost of new intrastate gas or old intrastate gas under a
new contract would protect intrastate gas from the low-cost interstate gas. See Harrison &
Formby, supra note 11, at 87.
120. It is possible that the Court envisioned a situation in which purchasers would be en-
couraged to breach the existing contract, pay damages, and negotiate a new interstate contract at a
much lower price.
121. Evidence of this interest can be seen in the number of motions made by various
Oklahoma groups to file amicus curiae briefs. A joint motion in support of ERG was filed by the
Energy Consumers & Producers Association, Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Association,
Service Drilling Co., Harrison L. Townes, Inc., Southland Drilling & Production Co., L.O. Ward,
and Amerada Hess Corporation. Joint Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae of Energy
Consumers & Producers, Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct.
697 (1983) (available Aug. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Sup. Ct. Brief file).
A brief in support of KPL was submitted jointly by Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., Oklahoma
Gas & Electric Co., Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, and the Oklahoma Association of Electric
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that the Oklahoma Natural Gas Price Protection Act (Oklahoma
Act) 12 2 served as a model for the Kansas Act.123  Additionally, many
long-term contracts for intrastate gas in Oklahoma contain indefinite
price escalator clauses, 24 and increases from those clauses may be
passed through to consumers upon approval by the Oklahoma Corpo-
ration Commission. 25 This situation is very similar to the one in Kan-
sas, but additional interest was generated by the fact that almost one
billion dollars was potentially at stake in Oklahoma.126 This is almost
eight times the figure involved in Kansas. 27 Perhaps because of this
dollar incentive, Energy Consumers & Producers Association v. Baker12
Cooperatives. Brief Amicus Curiae of Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., Energy Reserves. One brief
was submitted by the Attorney General of Oklahoma on behalf of the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission and the State of Oklahoma. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae, Energy
Reserves.
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 260.1-.13 (1981).
123. Brief Amicus Curiae of Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. at 2, Energy Reserves.
124. See Answer Brief of Intervenor-Defendant Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. at 1, Energy Con-
sumers & Producers Ass'n v. Baker, Nos. 79-320-D; 79-823-D (W.D. Okla. filed Mar. 20, 1979)
(withdrawn June 7, 1983). This brief refers to stipulations filed and dated March 20, 1980, includ-
ing Stip. 14, which indicates that 70% of Oklahoma Natural Gas contracts contained indefinite
price escalator clauses. Stip. 12 indicates that two types of indefinite escalator clauses existed in
long-term ONG gas contracts: price redetermination clauses and two-party favored nation
clauses. Both clauses are affected by the Oklahoma Act. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 260.4 (1981).
Redetermination clauses allow periodic renegotiation or redetermination of the contract
price. The price is usually related to current prices being paid in the field or area at the time of
renegotiation. The clause usually establishes a standard to determine the contract price such as
the average of the two or three highest prices being paid in the field or area. See 4 H. WILLAMS,
OIL & GAS LAW § 726, at 752-53 (1980).
Two-party favored nation clauses stipulate that if a buyer purchases gas in the same field or
area at a higher price than is paid under the contract in question, the buyer must thereafter pay
the seller the same price it is paying to other sellers. Id at 748.5. In other words, the buyer must
not favor one seller over another in a particular area; it must pay the highest price allowed in any
contract. See Natural Gas Regulation and Market Disorder, 18 TULSA L.J. 619, 627 n.53 (1983).
As of November 30, 1979, ONG was purchasing gas from 25 counties in which the § 102
price was being paid. See Stip. 18-19. Consequently, § 105 of the NGPA would have required
ONG to pay the § 102 price on their old intrastate gas contracts that contained indefinite escalator
clauses. However, the Oklahoma Act limited the effect of indefinite escalator clauses to the § 109
price. The December 1979 § 102 price was $2.336 per MMBtus whereas the § 109 price was
$1.774 per MMBtus. See 18 C.F.R. § 271.101 (1983).
ONG rates are illustrative since ONG is the most directly affected utility, and its figures are
used in this discussion for the sake of simplicity.
125. In addition to normal rate increase proceedings, public utilities in Oklahoma have auto-
matic pass-through authority through use of fuel adjustment clauses. OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, §§ 251-
257 (1981). This is almost identical to the rate increase procedure in Kansas. 103 S. Ct. at 702 n.3.
126. Brief Amicus Curiae of Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. at 19, Energy Reserves; see
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., Estimated Impact (Savings) of S.B. 49 on Oklahoma Utility Custom-
ers-ONG, PSO, and OG&E, 1979-1984, at 1 (1980) (unpublished study).
127. "The Legislature determined that the Price Protection Act would, between 1979 and
1984, foreclose almost $128 million in additional gas costs, assuming 10% annual gas price in-
creases under the NGPA." Brief for Appellee at n.69, Energy Reserves.
128. Nos. 79-320-D; 79-823-D (W.D. Okla. filed Mar. 20, 1979) (withdrawn June 7, 1983).
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was filed by numerous Oklahoma natural gas producers against the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission in an effort to have the Oklahoma
Act declared unconstitutional and allow those producers to claim the
higher price. Oklahoma Natural Gas (ONG) and the Oklahoma Asso-
ciation of Electric Cooperatives intervened as defendants. The case
was held in abeyance until a decision was reached in Energy Reserves.
The Supreme Court's decision was dispositive of the Oklahoma case,
since the Court found no contract clause violation in the Kansas Act
because no impairment was involved." 9 To the extent any impairment
existed, the Court found it justified by less compelling interests than
existed in Oklahoma. Challenges to the Oklahoma Act by Oklahoma
gas producers appeared fruitless in light of Energy Reserves; it is, there-
fore, no surprise that the Oklahoma suit was dropped.
The estimated one billion dollar difference between the section 102
price and the section 109 price was forecast by ONG to cost residential
customers an additional $44.78 in 1980, $58.01 in 1982, and $73.44 in
1984.130 These figures were, of course, based on the assumption that a
full pass-through would have been approved. Actual figures show that
the estimated one billion dollar difference was conservative. According
to Oklahoma Corporation Commission statistics, the price differential
between sections 102 and 109 resulted in a savings of $616.5 million
through 1982.131 The Commission estimated that 1983-84 savings
would be $474 million, making a total savings to customers of almost
$1.1 billion.'32 This calculation does not account for indirect costs
avoided. 133
If there is any validity to these figures, there can be little doubt
that a billion dollar increase in utility rates over a six-year period, with
its attendant effects, would be sufficient for the State of Oklahoma to
129. Energy Reserves, 103 S. Ct. at 708.
130. Answer Brief of Intervenor-Defendant Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. at 28, Energy
Consumers.
131. Duck, Gas Pricing Decision 'Billion Dollar Ruling, Tulsa Tribune, Jan. 25, 1983, at IB,
col. 1.
132. Id The news story that accompanies the Oklahoma Corporation Commission figures
incorrectly states that Oklahomans would have had to refund more than $1 billion to Oklahoma
gas producers and pay an additional $500,000 over the next two years. The chart illustrates that
these figures should have been $616.5 million and $474 million, respectively. Id at col. 5.
133. Of concern to residential customers would have been the potential indirect effect brought
about by an escalation of prices charged to industrial customers if industries had chosen to switch
to an alternative fuel. Natural Gas Regulation and Market Disorder, supra note 124, at 623. The
resulting loss of revenue to the utilities probably would have been passed through to remaining




Hogue: Legislative Impairment of Natural Gas Contracts: Energy Reserves
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983
1984] CONTR4 CT CL USE
find a significant and legitimate public purpose in protecting its utility
customers and economy. These interests allowed Oklahoma to exercise
its police powers to legislatively impair contracts between public utili-
ties and producers of natural gas.134
The current natural gas glut 35 gives Energy Reserves added signif-
icance in Oklahoma. The decision grants marginal relief to the high
prices that have prevailed during the glut 136 by allowing the Oklahoma
Act to limit the effect of indefinite price escalators. Were this not the
case, old intrastate gas contracts with indefinite escalator clauses in
Oklahoma would receive the higher section 102 price as opposed to the
section 109 price. 137
Of greater importance, however, is the position assumed by Energy
Reserves within the larger framework of the nationwide gas surplus.
The gas industry crisis calls into question the conventional wisdom of
entering into long-term purchase agreements 138 that have been consid-
ered essential to assure purchasers-pipelines and industrial custom-
ers-the necessary revenue to recover their investment in pipeline
equipment. 139 These contracts are proving to be troublesome in today's
market because they do not respond well to changes in supply and de-
mand,14° and when prices under contracts do change, it is generally
134. Considering the fact that the almost-identical Kansas Act passed constitutional muster in
Energy Reserves, it seems safe to assume that Oklahoma's adjustment of the rights and responsi-
bilities of contracting parties under the Oklahoma Act is reasonable and appropriate. See supra
text accompanying notes 95-104.
135. See, e.g., Tussing & Barlow, A Survival Strategy for Gas Companies In the Post-OPEC
Era, PuB. UTIL. FoRT., Feb. 3, 1983, at 13; Natural Gas Regulation and Market Disorder, supra
note 124, at 637; Cheaper Gas Will End Glut, Tulsa Tribune, Sept. 27, 1983, at 1B, col. 6.
136. The high prices were brought on for several reasons, including partial decontrol allowed
under the NGPA, recession, and high priced long-term contracts negotiated during the shortages
of the late 1970's. Industry in Crisis, Tulsa Tribune, Feb. 16, 1983, at 9F, col. 1; see also Hagar,
Deliverability Surplus Keeps U.S. Natural Gas Industry in Quandary, OIL & GAS J., June 6, 1983,
at 25 (points to the NGPA, decreased demand because of high prices, a warm winter in 1982-83,
and economic recession as being factors contributing to high prices and the glut).
137. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
138. Tussing & Barlow, supra note 135, at 16; see also Hagar, supra note 136, at 28 (illustrates
the recognition by one industry member that more short-term contracts and different types of
long-term contracts are part of the future for the industry).
139. See, e.g., Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63,
77 (1982); Natural Gas Regulation and Market Disorder, supra note 124, at 625; see also Tussing &
Barlow, supra note 135, at 16 (points to the need in the 1950's for long-term agreements before
lenders would extend credit and the FPC would certify a plant).
140. Industry in Crisis, supra note 136, at 1OF, col. 1. Many long-term gas contracts contain a
variety of clauses aimed at giving flexibility to these agreements. The indefinite escalator clauses
in Energy Reserves and the Oklahoma litigation are examples. See generally Pierce, supra note
139, at 77-82 (discussing the various types of provisions often included in gas contracts); Natural
Gas Regulation and Market Disorder, supra note 124, at 625-28 (same). Even so, some of these
clauses do not always accurately reflect market conditions. Id at 627.
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upward. 141 As a result, purchasers have been using whatever means
possible to terminate contracts, including flat refusals to honor contrac-
tual commitments. 142 Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that such
industry problems could arouse the interest of state legislatures.
It is clear from Energy Reserves that states can modify intrastate
natural gas contracts when a significant and legitimate public purpose
is served.' 43 This interpretation of the contract clause is buttressed by
the Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton decision'" in which the Court approved
Alabama's regulation of intrastate oil and gas contracts 45 because the
modification advanced a "'broad societal interest' . . . in protecting
consumers from excessive prices."'146  In view of the Court's apparent
reluctance to overturn state legislation on a contract clause basis, it is
entirely possible that if long-term intrastate gas contracts between pro-
ducers and purchasers result in high prices to consumers or great price
disparities between the interstate and intrastate gas markets, states
could modify these contracts without fear that the contract clause
would act as a bar. This possibility is illustrated by the recent passage
of the New Mexico Natural Gas Price Protection Act. 14 7 In enacting
this bill, the New Mexico legislature found that the average price for
intrastate gas in New Mexico has risen rapidly in the past five years.' 48
The legislature also found that a disparity exists between natural gas
141. Industry in Crisis, supra note 136, at 10F, col. 1.
142. Some contracts contain "market-out" clauses that allow the purchaser to lower the con-
tract price to a point where the gas can be marketed. Natural Gas Regulation andMarket Disorder,
supra note 124, at 627. Where these clauses exist, they are being exercised. If they do not exist,
implied theories of a right to get out of "economically unreasonable" contracts are being argued.
Tussing & Barlow, supra note 135, at 15. Some purchasers are attempting to justify their refusal to
take gas on a "force majeure" defense. See, e.g., id; Hagar, supra note 136, at 28; Ruling Enforces
Gas Purchase Contract, Tulsa Tribune, June 28, 1983, at 2B, col. 1. Others are simply refusing to
comply, preferring to take their chances in a lawsuit rather than pay for gas they can not sell.
Tussing & Barlow, supra note 135, at 15.
143. 103 S. Ct. at 705.
144. 103 S. Ct. 2296 (1983).
145. The contract clause dispute centered around an increased severance tax imposed by the
State. Id at 2299. The amendment creating the tax required that the tax be levied only upon the
producer or the severer of the oil or gas and not passed through to consumers. Id at 2300. The
appellants, producers of oil and gas within the state, were parties to contracts requiring purchasers
to reimburse them for severance taxes paid. Id The appellants challenged the pass-through pro-
hibition as being violative of the contract clause since the amendment denied them the right to
pass these costs on to their purchasers pursuant to their contract rights. Id at 2305. The Court
agreed that the appellants' contract rights were impaired but found no violation of the contract
clause. Id. at 2305-07.
146. Id at 2306 (quoting Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 249).
147. New Mexico Natural Gas Price Protection Act, ch. 123, 1984 N.M. Laws 219 (to be codi-
fied as amended at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 62-7-11 to -23).
148. Id. § 2(A)(2).
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sold on the interstate and intrastate markets and attributes this dispar-
ity "to the interaction of intrastate contractual provisions and federal
wellhead pricing regulations." '49 With these findings in mind and in
light of the public interest in natural gas production,1 50 the legislature
stated that the Act's purposes are to ensure tolerable prices for intra-
state gas and, as far as it is practicable, to assure that customers
purchasing New Mexico gas on the interstate market pay comparable
prices. 151 To achieve this end, the Act limits the price for intrastate gas
drilled prior to November 9, 1978, to the section 109 price allowed
under the NGPA. 52 The obvious effect is to alter contracts between
private parties, but despite this impairment, the New Mexico legisla-
ture was not reluctant to pass the bill. This action may be attributable
to the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the contract clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Energy Reserves decision is important for several reasons.
The decision marshals the elements of contract clause analysis to iden-
tify clearly the proper standard and lays to rest the confusion that sur-
rounds the clause. The decision is also important to Oklahoma because
it legitimized the Oklahoma Act and prevented a billion-dollar price
increase that would likely have been borne by Oklahoma consumers of
natural gas. Finally, the decision is important because it leaves open
the possibility that the Court's liberal interpretation of the contract
clause might lead states to rearrange long-term contractual rights that
are plaguing the nation's gas industry in order to protect both the in-
dustry and consumers of natural gas.
Joel A Hogue
149. Id. § 2(A)(7).
150. Id. § 2(A)(1).
151. Id. § 2(B).
152. Id. § 5.
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